


U.S. Media Assistance Programs in Serbia

July 1997–June 2002

PPC EVALUATION WORKING PAPER NO. 10



Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination
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PN-ACT-553

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U.S. Media Assistance in Serbia

July 1997–June 2002

Rich McClear, Suzi McClear, and Peter Graves
Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination

November 2003

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ANEM	Association of Independent Electronic Media
APEM	Association of Private Print Media
CeSid	Center for Free Elections and Democracy
DOS	Democratic Opposition of Serbia
EU	European Union
IREX	International Research and Exchanges Board
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NUNS	Independent Journalists' Association of Serbia
OSI	Open Society Institute (based in New York)
OSF	Open Society Foundation (based in Belgrade)
Otpor	Serbian youth organization
Pebbles	Platforms for External Broadcasting
ProMedia	The Professional Media Program
RAS	Ring Around Serbia
RTS	Radio and Television Serbia
SHC	Swedish Helsinki Committee
SMMRI	Strategic Marketing Media Research Institute
SPS	Socialist Party of Serbia
USAID/E&E	USAID Bureau for Europe and Eurasia (formerly ENI)
USAID/ENI	USAID Bureau for Eastern Europe and the New Independent States (USAID/E&E)
USAID/OTI	USAID Office of Transition Initiatives
USIS	U.S. Information Service
VOEM	ANEM's Dutch foundation

Preface

This is the fourth in a series of assessments of USAID media assistance programs conducted by the Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination. It focuses on Serbia, where international media assistance made a major contribution toward regime change in the aftermath of the crisis in Kosovo. The report discusses the nature and focus of USAID assistance, its impact on the democratization process, and the policy and programmatic lessons learned from the Serbian experience.

Rich and Suzi McClear wrote a background paper for the assessment in early 2002. During the fall of 2002, they and Peter Graves, Senior Media Advisor to the Bureau for Europe and Eurasia, conducted field work and wrote the report. I am extremely grateful to the authors for their hard work, penetrating analysis, and thoughtful suggestions.

I wish to acknowledge my appreciation to Management Systems International, which has been providing managerial and technical support for the assessments. I must also thank John Engels and Hilary Russell of International Business Initiatives for editing and producing this report.

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Acknowledgments

The authors are indebted to USAID for giving them the opportunity to work with such fine and capable people in Serbia. They include Ljiljana Smajlovic, whose media analysis—before she started working for IREX and after—has been insightful and cogent. Gene Mater, now of Freedom Forum and formerly with the International Media Fund, provided valuable information on the early days of U.S. media assistance. Gordana Jankovic, in Belgrade with the Open Society Foundation in 1991 and the institutional memory for media assistance in the region, generously shared insights. The Belgrade Media Center’s many publications and reports chronicled the state of the media throughout the period. Veran Matic, ANEM, and B92 opened their records. The authors made extensive use of IREX and USAID/OTI reports. Sara Brewer of USAID/OTI generously provided information on her office’s extensive activities in Serbian media. Ray Jennings, who ran USAID/OTI’s program in Serbia, shared candid views. Susan Abbott provided much source material from IREX and its reports to USAID. Sam Compton, the current IREX resident advisor in Belgrade, provided sharp insights into the program today and suggestions for how it should move forward. Srdjan Bogosavljevic and Darko Brocic from Strategic Marketing in Belgrade provided a wealth of research data. Finally, the authors referred to reports that they and others wrote over the five years they were involved in assisting the development of Serbian media.

The research for this paper took place in the fall of 2002. By the time the final draft was proofread, several significant changes had taken place. The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic slowed the entire democratization process, including privatization and media law reform. Nevertheless, the media’s role in Serbia’s democratic transition remains as important as ever.

Rick McClear, Suzi McClear, and Peter Graves

Executive Summary

The history of U.S. media assistance in Serbia includes two intertwined stories. The first is the story of the media's role in supplying Serbian citizens with the tools they needed to topple a repressive and belligerent regime. The second is the development of sustainable, independent, and professional media required to provide the Serbian people with the information they need to develop a democratic civil society.

The Media's Role in Regime Change

Regime change is the more dramatic of the stories. Former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic used captive media to consolidate power, promote nationalism, and pursue wars. Independent media played an essential role in toppling him. According to media professionals, international assistance was key to the survival, development, and national impact of the independent media in Serbia. When Milosevic refused to recognize the results of local elections in 1996, independent media outlets broadcast nonstop coverage of massive antigovernment demonstrations and kept the elections issue front and center. Following recognition of the results, dozens of municipal radio and television stations came under independent control.

Massive international aid quickly helped these stations develop into a network that could broadcast accurate information quickly. Surveys showed that large numbers of Serbs received information from these stations. Independent news agencies and publications—especially weekly newsmagazines—influenced public and elite opinion and aided the regime-change effort.

When dissension crept into the ranks of the opposition, the media remained united. Politicians

acknowledged that pressure from the independent media forced them to cooperate in defeating Milosevic. For example, an advisor to Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica said that independent media were more credible than opposition politicians: they forced politicians to see that the people were ahead of them in supporting a change of government.

Donors reported that their earliest and most constant partners were media outlets. Donors also helped NGOs and activist groups develop strategies and campaigns for the independent media. One such activist group was OTPOR, whose leaders said media coverage of their actions made the youth organization more effective; they credited independent broadcasting and daily papers with keeping OTPOR in the public eye. Independent media also broadcast activists' appeals for citizens to take to the streets to protect striking miners. Ultimately, the miners' efforts forced the government to accept the election results and triggered Milosevic's defeat in October 2000.

Two Approaches to Media Assistance

Serbian media assistance programs reflect two approaches to media development. Though they occasionally created friction, the differing approaches produced positive results. The goal of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) was to fund programs and media outlets that could disseminate messages pushing immediate political change. USAID/OTI characterized its activities as "pushing the reform agenda." This approach contrasted with but complemented that of USAID's Bureau for Europe and Eurasia (USAID/E&E), which supported long-term, sustainable media development projects. While

USAID/E&E's projects contributed to the short-term goal of regime change in Serbia, they were also designed to aid the democratic transition that followed.

Despite—or perhaps because of—this dynamic tension, the overall USAID program was very successful. Democratic elements in Serbia received—and still have—the media tools to effect democratic change. NGOs, media outlets, and democratic activists also received the topical programs and emergency infusions funded by USAID/OTI and USAID/E&E. Two years after the fall of Milosevic, personnel and basic media infrastructure remain in place to serve the ongoing democratic transition and broaden coverage of issues in public discourse.

Why USAID's Media Assistance Programs Succeeded

There is no “best” approach to media development. Before 1990, Yugoslavia had a stronger civil society than most postcommunist countries. Milosevic was careful to maintain a facade of the rule of law. This gave the opposition and elements of civil society some room to move, and, in the end, democratic elements made use of that space. Under President Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslav media enjoyed more freedom than other communist countries. This tradition—and Milosevic's desire to maintain the image of freedom—allowed the creation of media outlets and support institutions that later received USAID's media assistance.

Ultimately, USAID's media assistance programs in Serbia succeeded because of conditions that included the following:

- *Outlets had complete editorial freedom.* Because U.S. assistance went to media that were critical of U.S. policies at times, the program gained credibility.
- *Donors and media outlets were partners.* Many of the best ideas originated from the local media. Donors worked with them to transform these ideas into action.
- *Assistance from donors was coordinated on all levels,* from policymakers in capitals to implementers in the field.
- *Assistance was substantial.* The United States spent more than \$1 per Serb in 1999, the year before Milosevic left office. This was matched by significant European funding.
- *Assistance was sustained,* beginning in earnest in 1997 and continuing today.
- *Assistance addressed the independent media's range of needs,* including developing journalistic professionalism, building physical infrastructure, developing management skills, and strengthening legal protection for journalists and outlets.
- *U.S. media assistance was targeted at outlets and associations that reached a critical mass.* Because Serbia had hundreds of local radio and television stations and scores of local newspapers and cable systems, international media assistance could have been diluted.

Steps Needed to Consolidate Gains

Though Milosevic is gone, Serbian democracy is not yet secure. The work of professional and independent media is still essential to consolidate democratic gains and allow for the development of a transparent and truly democratic society. Independent media continue to provide leadership by shedding light on past crimes and identifying new democratic and economic opportunities. However, if independent media are to continue to exert this influence, media assistance must continue and concentrate on the following:

- *Legal reforms that promote both independent media's and citizens' right to information.*
- *Rationalization of frequency allocation.* This includes providing independent media with adequate frequencies and licenses secure from arbitrary revocation. It also includes giving

independent media outlets coverage comparable to that formerly enjoyed by media with close ties to the Milosevic regime.

- *Privatization.* Serbia could still fall into the trap of “crony capitalism” if control of yet-to-be privatized media outlets is given to friends of the government.
- *The creation of sustainable, public service-oriented outlets, with national coverage.* State broadcasters in the Balkans have been unable to perform the role served in the West by public broadcasters.
- *Targeted training* in investigative and enterprise journalism.
- *Development of a commercial market* sufficient to support media whose news coverage goes beyond “tabloid” journalism.
- *Capital investment unconnected to politicians or organized crime.*

The lessons of media assistance in Serbia may prove beneficial to other countries, including those in democratic transition and those in a pretransition phase, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and most other countries in the Middle East. To succeed, future media assistance programs will have to address these problems. The Serbian experience detailed in this paper is a useful starting point.

U.S. Media Assistance Programs in Serbia

Introduction

A coordinated international effort provided financial, moral, and political support to the efforts of NGOs, political parties, local governments, and independent media to unseat Milosevic. The European Union (EU) invested [17 million, and the U.S. Government spent over \$23 million in media aid between 1995 and 2002. Given this large investment, USAID needed an assessment of the media's role in the political changes and the fall of Milosevic.

USAID started an “experience review” in May 2002, commissioning a comprehensive paper on media assistance and sending a three-person team to Serbia to conduct interviews and study media changes. USAID and International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) also commissioned a series of surveys from Strategic Marketing in Belgrade. This paper integrates the results of these activities and reports.

This study begins with a discussion of the country context at the start of significant U.S. media aid in the spring of 1997. This context includes large audience increases for independent media outlets after major antigovernment events, the demonstrations that followed the 1996 municipal elections, and the opposition's taking control of municipal assemblies and numerous municipal radio and television stations.

The report then describes the evolution of the Serbian media assistance program, assesses its impact on regime change, and outlines programmatic achievements and shortcomings. This is followed by an analysis of independent media sustainability and the critical challenges now facing Serbian media. The paper concludes with lessons that USAID may wish to apply in other countries.

Political Context

The first mass demonstrations against Slobodan Milosevic's rule occurred in Belgrade in 1991, the year Slovenia and Croatia declared independence. After declarations of independence by Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, a civil war erupted that killed thousands and displaced millions. In 1995, U.S. pressure led to the Dayton Peace Accords and the stationing of 60,000 NATO troops in Bosnia.

Serbia was then governed by a ruling coalition comprising Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia, Mira Markovic's Yugoslav Left, and New Democracy. The opposition included the ultranationalist Radical Party of Vojislav Seselj and Zajedno (Together), an association of disparate political parties that did not hold together long.

In November 1996, the Zajedno coalition won municipal elections in 19 Serbian municipalities, including Belgrade. When Milosevic annulled the results, hundreds of thousands protested. Student organizations and Zajedno took part in planning demonstrations that tied up major cities. In the largest demonstration on January 13, 1997, an estimated million people took to the streets of Belgrade. The demonstrations lasted for more than 80 days, until the government recognized the election results. The opposition took power in most principal cities and organized a campaign to oust Milosevic. In this period, the U.S. State Department took a carrot-and-stick approach, launching USAID's democracy assistance program while continuing economic sanctions.

Continued violent persecution of ethnic Albanians contributed to NATO's bombing campaign against Serb forces in 1999. In this period, the International

Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia indicted Milosevic on charges of crimes against humanity. In October 2001, mass protests in Belgrade forced him to accept his defeat at the polls by Vojislav Kostunica. Soon after, Milosevic was extradited to face trial before the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.

Media Context

During Tito's regime, Yugoslavia enjoyed a degree of press freedom and media professionalism unknown in other communist countries. Many media outlets were "social property": in theory, they belonged to the entire society—not the state or the party—though the League of Communists had a great deal of influence. Articles in the criminal code ensured that media did not undermine the "self-management" system developed by the Tito government. After Tito's death, "the media...managed to avoid direct government interference so long as it did not frontally attack the Communist Party" (International Media Fund 1995, 38). Self-censorship remained an important control strategy.

When the communist system disintegrated, Serbia had several media houses. Between 1987 and 1992, Milosevic left some major outlets relatively free but worked to gain control over others. He initially targeted *Politika*, publisher of the most important serious daily paper, *Politika*, the popular tabloid *Politika Ekspres*, and several weeklies. After being taken over, *Politika* expanded into television and radio broadcasting and spread nationalist propaganda throughout the country.

Milosevic's next target was Radio and Television Serbia (RTS). In July 1991, a new law gave the government power to appoint its director general and governing board. Radio Belgrade and Tanjug, once a respected news agency, also came under Milosevic's control. According to one report, Tanjug became "a poison running through the veins of the country, so venomous was its propaganda stream" (International Media Fund 1995, 38).

To control the media, Milosevic used sections of

the penal code and libel laws, including the 1991 public information law and the Serbian Law on Radio-Television. The latter allowed the government to control frequency allocation and issue radio and television licenses to friends. Other licenses went to small stations that served to jam the spectrum, making outside independent broadcasts hard to receive beyond the immediate area of transmission.

With this control, Milosevic used the media to fan Serbian nationalism, beginning with the issue of Kosovo in the late 1980s. When the wars started, the media effort turned to Croatia. *Politika* and *Politika Ekspres* ran such headlines as "Serbs Must Get Weapons" and "How Long Are Serbs Going to Keep Waiting for a Peaceful Solution While the Others Are Killing Them?" (Thompson 1999, 72–73). During the Bosnian war, Serbian media denied Serb aggression and turned coverage against the victims. Television was the main carrier of Serbian state propaganda. During this time, surveys showed that most of the population believed the material on RTS news (Smajlovic 1997).

Governmental harassment of the independent media included police raids and visits by financial police and health and safety inspections. Despite harassment during the wars, B92, Radio Index, Studio B (until it was taken over), the newsweekly *Vreme*, and the daily *Nasa Borba* continued to function. Milosevic allowed radio stations to operate freely because he did not think they were important. It also allowed him to claim that he allowed dissent. By the time he tried to close B92 and Radio Index in 1996, they each had a million listeners per week.

In 1993, a group of stations that included Radio B92, Boom 93, and Radio Smederevo founded the Association of Independent Electronic Media (ANEM) as a first step toward challenging the power of state-controlled media. Beta, an independent news agency, was formed by former Tanjug employees. A corps of independent news people and media outlets became the base from which a broader independent media could be built

with the help of direct aid and training offered by international donors.

After the 1995 Dayton Accords, Milosevic brought more media outlets under his control. A major demand of the 1996 election demonstrations was media freedom. Thousands of people blew whistles and banged pots and pans to “drown out the lies” of the news broadcast on RTS. After the government tried to close down Radio B92, “Free Media” became one of the predominant slogans on signs carried by demonstrators, who regularly threw eggs at the Politika and RTS buildings.

Control of media outlets was at stake in the 1996 elections because Serbian municipalities controlled local radio and television stations. After Milosevic was forced to recognize the election results, more than a dozen municipal radio and television stations could rebroadcast the independent news programs of B92 and produce local independent news.

Readership of independent newspapers and weekly newsmagazines also grew rapidly. This set the stage for the beginning of the major U.S. aid effort for independent media. With the exception of the daily papers *Danas* and *Glas Javnosti*, all of the major media outlets and support agencies and the municipal stations were in place and enjoying a large increase in their audiences by the spring of 1997 when the United States began major media assistance.

The Serbian Media at a Turning Point, 1996–97

In Serbia, independent media remained in the shadow of state-controlled outlets, and their professional standards were poor. A 1997 analysis for IREX stated:

Yugoslav independent media, though stubbornly resisting government influence and control, are still a long way from their professional goals. By Western standards they come up short in regard to objective, thorough, and ethical reporting. Article sourcing and backgrounding are still rare, and the relevance of a report is often difficult to fathom. Some journalists seem to believe it's perfectly valid to have a bias, as

long as it's not pro-government. (Smajlovic 1997, 12)

The turning point came in the winter of 1996 and the spring of 1997. Overall media consumption went up but independent media were the big winners. Their support grew when people saw demonstrations in the streets that were not reflected in the coverage of state-controlled television or newspapers. Before 1996, independent Radio B92 was seventh and Radio Index ninth in the Belgrade market of about 60 stations (Radio Index 1997). During political demonstrations in the winter of 1996–97, B92 and Radio Index tied for the number one position in Belgrade with over a million weekly listeners each (BeoMedia 1997). The combined circulation of independent daily newspapers reached 430,000, outpacing those supporting the government. The readership of one independent weekly newsmagazine grew to 328,000 (Smajlovic 1997, 4–5). *Dnevni Telegraph*, the independent and flashy tabloid, and *Blic* began to build readership. The newsweekly *Vreme* had a circulation of 18,000 before the 1996 elections, and *Nin* broke away from Politika (Smajlovic 1997, 6). As ratings and readership went up, so did advertising revenues. By this time, international donors began to show interest in supporting independent media.

Radio and the Internet

Considerable international attention resulted from the banning of radio stations B92, Radio Index, and Boom 93 in December 1996. B92 and Radio Index were soon back on the air, but Boom 93, in Milosevic's hometown, remained banned for several months.

B92 used the internet to keep in touch with the Serbian diaspora and link radio stations. When B92 was shut down, it used its internet service provider to feed its news by audio and text to the Voice of America and the BBC, which then rebroadcast it back into Serbia.

After the demonstrations ended, B92 fell to second place in the ratings and Radio Index fell to fourth. Nationwide, the dominant station in the ratings was Radio Kosava, owned by Marija Milosevic, the

president's daughter. In Belgrade, 60 signals cluttered the radio dial. Most were music operations with little or no news. Though B92 had a well-developed news department with trained reporters—several of whom were stringers for international broadcasters—the station had very limited coverage, even within Belgrade. Outside the city, 22 radio stations broadcast news with some degree of independence. Their coverage reached about 70 percent of the population.

In June 1997, ANEM took in 16 “associate” members, including several municipal stations and a few private ones. Within a year, membership jumped to 33.

Independent radio stations were weak in marketing, and generally did not know how to program to attract an audience in a competitive market. B92's biggest weakness was its financial structure (McClear 1997a). The station attracted “cause” donations from organizations like Soros and the Swedish Helsinki Committee (SHC), but did not know how to achieve long-term viability. Further, most municipal radio stations were overstaffed and “old” employees could not be laid off. Independent stations also had very old or very little equipment.

Television

Like much of the rest of Eastern and Central Europe, people in Serbia received most of their news from television. RTS Research Center indicated that 5 million watched television regularly (while 4 million listened to radio and 900,000 read newspapers daily). RTS was the dominant television network and the only one with complete national coverage; its three channels and regional service accounted for 49.7 percent of viewers (SMMRI 1998). TV Pink, an entertainment channel whose owners were friendly to Milosevic, controlled 16.5 percent. BK Telecom and TV Politika were also progovernment: together they accounted for 7.5 percent of Serbia's viewing audience.

By the spring of 1997, Serbia had about 60 potentially independent television stations. The Belgrade municipal station, Studio BTV, was the most important of these, reaching a third of the population and achieving a 4.5 percent audience share. The three independent television stations in Nis, Serbia's third largest city, had very small audiences, and there was no independent television in Novi Sad, the second largest city. In central Serbia, there were 12 other “independent” stations—mostly municipal—watched by 14.6 percent of the television audience. Municipal television stations varied in professionalism and independence. Some were subject to the influence of newly elected mayors or had editors who were not independent. Some stations—such as Pancevo, Kragujevac, and TV 5, a private station in Nis—had high standards.

Print

In 1996, there were 590 newspapers registered in Serbia, including 17 dailies. They were read by two-thirds of the population; slightly more than half read progovernment papers (SMMRI 1997). *Politika*, the oldest paper in Belgrade, was close to the regime and enjoyed a privileged position. *Nasa Borba* was an antiregime daily owned by a private company. *Blic*, *Dnevni Telegraph*, and *Politika Ekspres* were tabloids; the first two were “independent,” and the third was close to the government.

Statistics on newspaper circulation were unreliable in the spring of 1997. The best information suggested that the circulation of opposition papers exceeded progovernment papers during the demonstrations. When they ended, circulation dropped, but not far behind state-supporting newspapers.

In the spring of 1997, the three major newsweeklies were the sensationalist *Nedeljni Telegraph*, the largest selling; *Nin*, formally part of the *Politika* publishing house; and *Vreme*, founded in the fall of 1990. *Vreme* became the trendsetter, considered by many to set the standard for Serbian journalism. During this period, several local weeklies that were part of municipal publishing houses became independent.

All independent newspapers contended with an annual importation cap of 8,000 tons of newsprint—an amount that *Politika* alone exceeded. The availability of newsprint was a major problem for independent papers.

Supporting Institutions

At the beginning of 1997, Serbia had three news agencies: Tanjug, the official state agency; FoNet, founded by former Tanjug employees in 1993; and Beta, established in 1994 by other former Tanjug employees. With a good reputation for professionalism, accuracy, and reliability, Beta became Serbia's major independent news agency.

Among other institutions sustaining independent Serbian media was the Belgrade Media Center, established in 1994 to provide training, a policy forum, and a place for media professionals to meet. Other supporting agencies included several advertising firms that were affiliates of international agencies; Partner Research, an affiliate of the Gallup organization; and BeoGrafiti, which conducted radio research. In early 1997, Strategic Marketing began work in market research, ratings, focus groups, and monitoring media for advertisers to ensure that ads contracted were run.

History and Focus of Media Assistance Programs

This chapter briefly summarizes assistance to Serbian independent media between 1990 and 1995. It then divides subsequent assistance into four phases: the “takeoff” (June 1997–February 1999), when USAID resumed media assistance to Serbia; “survival time” (March 1999–May 2000), the period of NATO bombing and increased governmental harassment of independent media; the elections (May–October 5, 2000), when media assistance efforts focused on providing information to voters and supported the election process; and “development time” (October 5, 2000–June 2002), after the fall of Milosevic, when media development and the reform agenda again became the focus of media assistance programs.

Media Assistance 1990–95

Media aid from the U.S. Government from 1990 to 1995 consisted of \$600,000 in support from the International Media Fund to provide equipment to Studio B, *Vreme*, Vin (an independent production company), Borba, and some regional media. The Media Fund provided technical support and grants to B92 and financial support to the Belgrade Media Center and *Vreme*. The fund ceased operations in 1995, when USAID's Bureau for Eastern Europe and the New Independent States (USAID/ENI) began ProMedia.¹

The EU's €1.7 million in aid was administered by the International Federation of Journalists between 1993 and 1997. Most of the aid directly supported media outlets including B92, *Vreme*, and *Nasa Borba*. The SHC also provided aid, especially to B92.

The Open Society Institute (OSI) has been involved in the region since 1991. Its main beneficiaries were B92 and NUNS (the Independent Journalists' Association of Serbia). B92 received grants to purchase equipment and, later, to produce programs. This assistance evolved into operational support and support for the formation of ANEM. The Open Society Foundation (OSF) in Serbia facilitated meetings with journalists that led to the formation of NUNS and, out of that, the Media Center. One media expert interviewed for this report said “U.S. support [from 1990 to 1995] was sporadic, European aid was small but steady, and Soros was our lifesaver.” Without the OSI's and OSF's instrumental assistance in these early years, there might have been no base to support in 1997.

The Takeoff, June 1997–February 1999

USAID resumed media assistance in Serbia 1997. The timing of the resumption of aid was driven by two factors. The first was municipal elections of 1996 and the demonstrations that followed, when radio and television stations emerged that were

¹ USAID/ENI was later renamed the Bureau for Europe and Eurasia (USAID/E&E).

controlled by municipalities won by the opposition. The second factor was the clear evidence that Milosevic would not be the guarantor of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina that he once seemed. As a result, State Department officials approved the launch of USAID's democracy assistance program and continued economic sanctions.

Some media activities were carried out by the U.S. Information Service (USIS). USAID's media activities were funded by USAID/ENI and the Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI). ENI funded IREX and Internews to implement the bureau's overall media development strategy in Serbia; OTI worked directly with local media, NGOs, and other civil society groups. USAID gave IREX great freedom to devise and carry out its strategy. This was crucial to the program's credibility in Serbia.

USAID coordinated its media assistance programs at all levels with other donors. During this period, five donor conferences organized by OSI helped coordinate assistance and policy at the highest levels. On the ground, different implementers took turns coordinating day-to-day operations.

While all U.S. donors shared the belief in working through local partners, there was an important difference in the approach. USAID/ENI preferred to create immediate impact through grants to media outlets and NGOs that wanted to produce programs. USAID/ENI, through IREX, also wanted to get information out quickly, but by developing existing media outlets that could be sustained over a period of 5–8 years.

The goals and methods of USAID's two primary media funders—ENI and OTI—usually combined well, but there were sometimes disagreements. From the start, USAID/OTI funded more media outlets than would ultimately be sustainable, believing that if enough seeds were sown, some would fall on fertile ground. USAID/ENI's approach, implemented by IREX, was more targeted, concentrating resources into institutions that would serve the post-Milosevic transition.

Sometimes USAID/ENI and IREX felt that USAID/OTI's support diluted its effort to build a critical mass, while USAID/OTI felt that USAID/ENI and IREX were too involved in building institutions.

Broadcast and Internet Support

Broadcast—especially radio—was the priority area of U.S. Government support during the takeoff period. Assistance began with equipment to improve broadcasting and production capacity. The next goal was to build the ANEM radio network. IREX gave ANEM a grant to hire a director for radio, the British Embassy provided satellite downlinks for the stations, and the BBC provided satellite time to transmit programs. Live broadcasts started on 16 stations in June 1997 and expanded to 33 stations by June 1998.

In May 1998, IREX sponsored radio research that was followed with training involving every ANEM station. IREX worked with the BBC to develop an advertising package and strategy to appeal to local and international advertisers, but NATO bombing halted the effort.

In June 1998, the OSI convened a broad range of donors to create a support package for an ANEM TV network. Soros, USAID, and the EU each pledged \$2.5 million. The conference and the large pledges marked the beginning of real coordination between donors. Despite the interruption by NATO bombing, the donors lived up to their pledges.

Radio and television projects were supported by extensive news training and business consultation: 75 radio journalists were trained, at least one from each ANEM radio affiliate. Under contract to IREX, InVision conducted in-station TV news training and worked with ANEM to develop a curriculum to be used by ANEM's trainers.² All USAID-sponsored training had follow-up at stations, which helped assure buy-in from managers and owners.

² Internews Serbia changed its name to InVision in 2001.

B92 had started its internet service provider, Opennet, in November 1995. Soros gave B92 money for internet development before the 1996 municipal elections, and in 1997 USIS added major funding. The internet became the primary means by which B92 radio and television avoided Serbian government sanctions and continued broadcasting to over 70 percent of the population. Audio files were sent over the internet to the BBC in London, which rebroadcast the signals to over 30 radio stations throughout Serbia.

USIS also worked with B92 to create the Opennet public access center in the USIS center in downtown Belgrade. The U.S. Government was able to guarantee high-speed access when B92 could not. USIS and B92 sponsored internet training for journalists and citizens, including a “gray-haired web” program for 1,000 people over age 60. OTI also made grants to ANEM for internet access at stations.

Print Support

IREX offered training and some business support to print media in the second half of 1997. In 1998, an IREX discussion paper speculated on the possibility of developing a strong independent newspaper for Serbia. This triggered a strategic discussion among key donors. Out of this meeting came a proposal to establish an independent printing plant. As government pressure had forced several Belgrade papers to do their printing in Montenegro, the goal was to develop independent printing capacity in Belgrade.

A new daily, *Danas*, began publication with help from European donors and the OSF. To help achieve its goal of becoming a serious independent national newspaper, IREX hired a local business expert to help the paper develop a comprehensive business plan and sent two *Danas* employees to Prague to work on it. USAID/OTI and IREX convinced other donors to condition future grants on the paper hitting the benchmarks of this business plan.

Survival Time, March 1999–May 2000

During the NATO bombing, the Serbian information ministry required all media to report what state media were saying. Some independent stations shut down rather than abide by the regulations. In March 1999, B92 was forced off the air and its premises taken over by the government. Fines levied under wartime media laws cost independent media almost \$800,000 (IREX 2000d). One consequence was the bankruptcy of ABC Grafika, Belgrade’s independent printing house.

Most donors were reluctant to support Serbian media during this period, fearing any association with “the enemy” could bring harm to their media partners. After the bombing ended, donors and implementers helped reestablish independent media weakened during the bombing.

USAID, through IREX, gave grants to B92 and the Media Centre during the bombing campaign. During this period, neither U.S. Government officials nor U.S. implementers were allowed to work in Serbia. The U.S. Government set up offices in Budapest. IREX operated their program from Podgorica, with local staff in Belgrade. For safety reasons, IREX decided not to reopen its Belgrade office, and its Serbian staff worked from their homes. Serbs played a greater part in administering the program, which resulted in a strong and responsible local staff in Belgrade operating with only limited supervision.

The SHC, NPA, and OSF reopened their offices in Belgrade shortly after the bombing ceased. SHC became the EU’s implementer and began coordinating international donor aid with regular meetings and internet contact. IREX Belgrade staff regularly attended these donor meetings. Donors developed a single grant application so that each could share the same information about grantees. Donors also shared experiences with different media outlets so they could reinforce performance and reporting standards. This was needed because many donors could not travel to Belgrade to administer grants or programs.

At a September 1999 meeting in Budapest, donors heard presentations from Serbian media and pledged support for regeneration. As part of this coordinated international effort IREX provided \$753,000 in “survival grants” to media outlets in Serbia by September 30. The largest grant went to the ANEM regeneration project. The EU contributed €1 million in emergency grants and USAID/OTI made 13 emergency grants during this period.

In the fall of 1999, while ANEM conducted a technical survey of radio and television stations that it shared with donors, IREX began a survey to determine which stations were still functioning and what support they needed. IREX also commissioned a study of how ANEM TV could broadcast via satellite and began negotiations with the Media Center for it to help gauge media professionalism and whether coverage was balanced.

USAID/OTI remained geared toward getting immediate information out to people in Serbia. It sought to identify and connect influential nonnationalist individuals and groups who favored peace and democracy with appropriate media outlets and broader audiences. The purpose was to identify activists and “mobilize creative, practical, and culturally sensitive local individuals to craft innovative campaigns that spread the ‘good news’ about successful transition interventions and encourage a national sense of hope and confidence about the future.” By contrast, USAID/ENI’s purpose was the rebuilding and improvement of physical and institutional infrastructure and providing journalists and media managers with the skills and resources to move toward sustainability (USAID/OTI 1998, 9; IREX 1999c, 1).

Broadcast Support

During the NATO bombing, USAID/ENI and USAID/OTI funded a “Ring Around Serbia” (RAS). FM transmitters in Bosnia, Kosovo, Croatia, and Romania, directed toward Serbia, rebroadcast content from Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, the BBC, Deutsche Welle, and Radio France International. These transmissions covered

much of the country, especially north of Belgrade, with some signal. Strategic Marketing estimated that 250,000 listened to RAS news programs in November 1999—400,000 after the fall of Milosevic. In key areas, where no local independent broadcast outlets existed, these broadcasts may have played an important role.

One of IREX’s first goals was to end Serbian isolation from the world journalism community. IREX helped Serbian journalists attend international meetings and twinned Serbian stations with others in Central Europe through a “sister station” project. IREX worked with ANEM and OSI to develop a system by which live radio and television news and entertainment programs could be beamed back into Serbia via satellite. Portable television and radio equipment—easily movable in case of a police raid—was located in Belgrade, with backup facilities and a satellite uplink in Bosnia. A package of entertainment programming from the United States helped draw viewers to the programming. IREX also supported broadcast training that complemented network development, strengthening both the network hub and local stations that contributed to a national newscast.

Print Support

A major problem for newspapers and magazines was the lack of newsprint. The government would not allow independent media to import newsprint. IREX negotiated more than \$600,000 in grants with local papers and the Association of Private Print Media (APEM) to buy and distribute newsprint. The IREX contribution was part of a larger project that included European donors. IREX also made grants to Beta to pay subscription fees to keep the independent news agency afloat and to permit newspapers to continue to use its services. USAID/OTI gave grants to *Reporter* magazine in Banja Luka, and worked to extend coverage into Serbia of other Bosnian media.

The Elections, May 2000–October 5, 2000

The focus of media assistance programs in this period was the Yugoslav federal presidential and

parliamentary elections scheduled for September 24. USAID and the donor community made a concerted effort before the elections to provide citizens with the information they needed to make up their minds, and helped prepare parties and NGOs for the elections. Unions, youth organizations, and municipal governments joined the effort. The media strategy for the election concentrated on four areas.

1. *Ensure that Serbs received fair election coverage from as many sources as possible.* Since the most credible news came from local sources, IREX made grants to radio and television stations to purchase transmitter tubes, more efficient antennas, and new transmission lines. IREX and NPA supported a “pirate” television transmitter in Belgrade that could be held in reserve and used during a critical time. IREX also purchased and distributed 10 mini television cameras to television stations or independent producers.

IREX also worked with B92 radio and ANEM TV to quickly build mountaintop transmitters in Bosnia and Romania to rebroadcast B92 and ANEM programming throughout Serbia on ANEM member stations. The U.S. Government called the project Pebbles (Platforms for External Broadcasting); it was called the Network of Networks by ANEM. Two weeks before the September 2000 elections, ANEM television began broadcasting from Bosnia and Romania and on 15 stations throughout Serbia. B92’s signal became available in Belgrade from a Bosnian transmitter on July 17, 2000. The program put pressure on the Milosevic government and kept B92’s staff together while the station was off the air in Belgrade. From the start, editorial control remained with B92. The goal was to allow a banned Serbian media outlet to operate independently of either U.S. or Serbian government control.

2. *Ensure that independent media outlets had professional content.* SHC drew up a list of independent television and radio stations in Serbia that produced news and information programs. IREX, USAID/OTI, OSF, and donors made sure that every station programming independent news

received support to continue news operations for the six weeks leading up to the elections. USAID/OTI and IREX made substantial grants to independent producers for preelection coverage. The programs, along with B92 radio and television news, were available to stations via the Network of Networks/Pebbles satellite service from Bosnia.

3. *Produce and air public service announcements promoting NGO election activities.* Almost all USAID-funded agencies were part of this campaign. USAID/OTI and IREX made several grants for various NGO election activities. The income the stations derived from the spots supported their operations. For example, one NGO, the Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSid) ran spots on independent radio and television stations, ostensibly to recruit poll watchers. Their real purpose was to make the CeSid logo recognizable and ensure the public knew that the vote counters were average citizens who could be believed. The campaign was based around a fair vote count with the simple slogan “1+1=2.”
4. *Support election night coverage.* The National Democratic Institute and CeSid coordinated the activities of pollwatchers who independently reported the vote count from most districts around the country. They faxed or phoned in results to the Media Center, which immediately put them out over the internet. The internet and satellite interface provided by the Network of Networks/Pebbles platforms assured that election results were received by local radio and television stations and viewers watching satellite broadcasts. By 10 p.m., the Media Center reported that Kostunica had won, likely in the first round. B92’s satellite service put out the results for rebroadcast on local stations. The results were also publicized on B92, CeSid, and Media Center websites. In Belgrade, Radio Index, the one independent radio station still operating, carried the election results. So did TV Pancevo, an ANEM member located in a Belgrade suburb. Donors had bought it a high-powered transmitter knowing it was likely to be shut down within hours of beginning broadcasting. On election night, TV Pancevo

broadcast election results for five hours with high power, adding coverage to Belgrade.

Development Time, October 5, 2000–June 30, 2002

With the departure of Milosevic, Serbia began the democratic and economic transformation that some neighboring countries had initiated 11 years earlier. Media assistance programs returned to the job of media development and began supporting the reform agenda. One of the first decisions donors made was to continue coordinating aid. They continued weekly meetings and use of the single grant application; they also began to develop unified reporting and business standards for all media.

The donors realized they could not suddenly abandon media outlets that had become used to international support. They agreed to a series of transition grants to help keep stations and newspapers operating. However, a condition of the grants was that the assisted outlets had to produce business plans within three months.

Donor Coordination

As early as 1994, OSI argued that donors had to coordinate their efforts to assist independent media in Serbia. Coordination was easier after the NATO bombing campaign ended in July 2000. Media assistance was high on the political priority list because the U.S. Government's openly stated goal was to effect regime change. In the year before Milosevic departed, the U.S. spent \$1 in media development for every Serb. Funds from Soros, the EU, and bilateral donors doubled that amount.

Although OSI and other smaller donors and implementers—including Press Now, the SHC, and NPA—had begun meeting and sharing information prior to 1997, the big three donors (the European Commission, OSI, and USAID) effectively started coordinating their efforts in late 1997. All donors and their implementing partners did not follow the same path or always agree to fund the same outlets or proposals. However, they agreed on basic principles, including no assistance for the national state media and most assistance in the broadcast sector going to or through ANEM.

Donor coordination meant maintaining contacts, sharing information, and holding regular meetings. The first donor meeting was held in Brussels in June 1998 to review ANEM/B92's proposal for a television network, one that OSI and USAID had agreed to cofund. After the meeting, the European Commission and smaller donors pledged their support. The agendas of subsequent meetings held every six months expanded to include southeast European countries, Belarus, and Ukraine. Coordination was made easier because most of USAID's media program was overseen by one person in Washington who could definitively speak for the program. Although, in most cases, country-based management is preferable, an experienced technical manager in Washington who could deal directly with the Department of State and Washington-based USAID decisionmakers proved effective for Serbia, especially after the bombing ended.

On-the-ground donor coordination occurred weekly. From October 1999, OSF and SHC convened the meetings, with the participation of local IREX (Serbian) staff, NPA, and Press Now. Donors divided up projects so that all essential media outlets were covered and none received duplicate aid. Aid was also coordinated to all local radio and television stations, and to independent producers who provided programs for the ANEM television feed. Coordination included sharing assessments and reviews of projects, and cooperating in getting material across borders and around customs authorities.

Coordination was also important to the task of providing equipment and newsprint. The single grant application developed meant that the same questions were asked and answers were shared. Sometimes implementers would trade projects. By the summer of 2000, implementers had been working together for two or three years: a high degree of trust, loyalty, and common purpose bound them into an effective, coordinated team that transcended national boundaries. Once Kostunica was elected and media development fell several notches down the priority list, coordination was not as strong.

The Impact of Media Assistance on Regime Change

Independent media was an essential actor in the regime change in Serbia. While some Western media advocates trumpet the role of independent media in the overthrow of the Milosevic regime, Serbian media professionals were more modest. Activists outside the media—including politicians, NGO representatives, and labor—were more willing to attribute independent media with the largest role in the overthrow. More importantly, a poll by Strategic Marketing indicated that the Serbian public believes that the independent media played the key role (SMMRI 2002a).

While no national radio or television surveys were commissioned during the pre-election period, in the fall of 2002 Strategic Marketing surveyed 1,000 residents about the last months of the Milosevic regime. Although most Serbs cited state television as their main source of information, independent media were spontaneously indicated as the most important source of information that influenced people's voting behavior and helped Kostunica win the election (SMMRI 2002a). Further, even when it was not the main means of communication, many people used radio to "fact check" what they saw on state television.

Otpor and CeSId activists testified that radio was the best medium to respond quickly and get information out inexpensively. During the miners' strike, activists cited the importance of print in forming public opinion, especially *Blic* and *Glas Javnosti*, and the newsweeklies' coverage of areas affected by radio blackouts. The internet also made it possible to share information and audio files between stations, activist cells, and even transmitters.

Independent media made Serbians aware that regime change was possible and gave voice to opposition and civil society groups. John Fox, who worked for OSI, said the independent media kept alive the possibility that changes in Serbia could be initiated internally. While politicians changed sides and the NGO com-

munity was just forming, the independent media provided a consistent voice that lobbied the United States and Europe to assist democratic reform.

One of the most important contributions of the independent media was to plant the idea that Kostunica could win. Poll reports by Strategic Marketing that showed an increasing trend toward Kostunica and his party were played heavily in the independent media, especially by *Blic*.

By maintaining operations under difficult conditions, independent media outlets provided a sense of hope and solidarity to civil society. They covered their events and protected them by publicizing any beatings or harassment. The independent media thus gave dissidents and activists courage and protection (SMMRI 2002e, 14).

B92 and its top management played a critical role in organizing opposition to the government's media censorship and harassment of democracy advocates in Serbia. Veran Matic, editor in chief of B92, was also chairman of ANEM, which not only trained journalists and provided network news but lobbied against governmental censorship and harassment. ANEM, under Matic's signature, provided timely updates to Serbs and the international community. ANEM also assisted the development of other fledgling organizations, including Otpor.

Indeed, it was the organizational and creative abilities of B92 and ANEM that played—and continue to play—a key role in the entire democratic movement in Serbia. Though Matic and his colleagues at ANEM and B92 were criticized for their strong ties to donors, they were responsible for many of the critically important strategic moves, such as use of the internet, external broadcasting, and domestic and international lobbying in support of Serbian democracy and against government restrictions on the media. With politicians changing alliances, Matic was the one constant voice speaking for a democratic Serbia. The changes could not have been achieved without the tireless and uniquely creative talents of Matic and his colleagues.

Radio B92 was an important voice of dissent. Between 1996 and 1999, when B92 became an independent internet service provider, it helped the media stay together at a time when the Zajedno political coalition was disintegrating. Slobodan Homen of Otpor also stressed the importance of the station's promotion of youth culture: "B92 was the voice of freedom, the only place to have different views.... Without it we would not have survived." "Rock the Vote," the independent media's extensive get-out-the-vote campaign and the rock concerts heavily promoted by ANEM radio stations, increased the turnout of young voters who were more likely to support the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS).

The weeklies *Nin* and *Vreme* also played an important role in forming opinion among the opposition elite. One Otpor activist said that the weeklies and the daily *Danas* helped restore legitimacy to intellectuals and gave a needed intellectual framework for direct street action.

Independent media disseminated credible information, prevented election fraud, and exerted pressure for the acceptance of election results. Homen asserted that the marriage of B92 with local media outlets was "the genius that caused the change." While B92 was the most respected source of news in Belgrade, the countryside distrusted Belgrade. Local radio stations were a focus of local pride. ANEM married B92's professionalism with local patriotism.

The pressure of ANEM as a lobbying arm within Serbia, legal support given to stations by ANEM attorneys, and the promise of substantial international assistance to local stations kept editorial staff independent of political struggles in the municipalities.

The United States placed no editorial restraints on the media it supported; Serbian independent journalists and media who criticized NATO bombing continued to get U.S. support. As Ljiljana Smajlovic of *Nin* said: "U.S. aid came with no strings attached, no stigma. That was the miracle of it."

The independent media provided the only serious coverage of opposition political leaders and attempted to be unbiased. Independent media gave the only substantial print news coverage to the opposition. Media Center monitoring for the week before the election shows the independent newspaper *Danas* ran 27 stories about Kostunica and 23 about Milosevic. The state-leaning *Politika* ran 16 stories about Kostunica and 194 about Milosevic.

People believed the parallel vote total reported by CeSid pollsters, largely because it was almost identical to those reported by DOS and the extreme nationalist party of Vojislav Seselj. CeSid's analysis showed local ANEM stations or Radio Index covered all but nine of the 63 municipalities that Kostunica won. The opposition vote grew substantially in several communities covered by ANEM stations where pro-Milosevic candidates had won large majorities in 1996.

In the 11 days between the elections and Milosevic's concession, the media played a crucial role prompting popular action that forced the government to accept the results. Demonstrations broke out across the country, and local independent media publicized them. City TV in Nis produced a music video with major local pop stars and footage of the 1996–97 demonstrations and the song "This Time We Won't Stop." Stations in Nis and Kraljevo set up video projectors in town squares to relay pictures of demonstrations around the country and create gathering points in their towns. Fifteen cable systems around the country began rebroadcasting B92's signal.

Speeches claiming victory by Kostunica and political leader Zoran Djindjic were covered extensively on the local independent radio and television stations. One of Kostunica's speeches, transmitted by TV Cacak, TV 5, and Radio Ozon, sparked demonstrations and roadblocks. When local authorities cut the mobile phone service protesters were using, the local television stations ran crawls under their pictures giving the locations of blockades and directing viewers to demonstrations.

In Lazarevac, where there were no local independent media, coal miners went on strike to protest the government not recognizing the election results (SMMRI 2002c, 5). B92 informed CNN, the BBC, and other international media of the situation. TV Cacak sent crews to Lazarevac to cover the strike. Other stations in central Serbia rebroadcast the footage, and a convoy of support assembled in Cacak. Dragan Kovacevic of Radio TV Cacak said: “As a result of our reporting there was a 30 kilometer column of cars that went to Belgrade. On October 4 we said ‘Let’s go’ and 10,000 people followed.” On October 5, the convoy entered Belgrade. People from Central Serbia, joined by others from Belgrade attacked the Federal Parliament. They took over RTV Serbia and broadcast a speech by Kostunica that signaled Milosevic’s end.

Thomas Carothers believes that Western aid to the media, along with support to opposition parties, municipal governments, and NGOs, played a major part in the downfall of Milosevic. He listed the following factors contributing to the success of the media assistance campaign (Carothers 2001, 5–6):

- The aid effort was large
- The campaign was sustained
- The aid was decentralized
- Much of the aid went directly to the recipient society
- Aid and diplomacy reinforced each other
- U.S. and European aid worked from the same script
- Aid coordination was better than normal

Obstacles to Media Assistance Programs

The lack of a banking system, instability of the Yugoslav dinar, and economic sanctions made transfer of funds into Serbia difficult. Assistance agencies had to carry large amounts of cash, and media outlets had to establish “offshore” bank accounts. When a Montenegro bank used by many NGOs went under, the situation became more complicated.

Because programs had to be run from outside Serbia, it was difficult to manage grants to small media outlets scattered around the county. Outlets did not want copies of grant documents from U.S.-funded agencies in their files. Papers were signed in Montenegro or Hungary, and copies were kept outside the country.

Secure communications were also a problem. A great deal of time was spent coding and decoding messages because local media outlets were harassed by Serbian officials. The harassment included heavy fines, arrest and questioning, armed intrusions into facilities, seizure of equipment and records, closings, the forced bankruptcy of the major independent printing plant, and jamming of independent broadcasters.

Untying the Knot

The problem of getting equipment to the right people at the right time continues to haunt the program. For example, ANEM’s Dutch foundation (VOEM) held title to equipment in trust for the municipal stations. IREX funded lawyers to work on the complicated problem of ownership. If VOEM granted equipment to stations before privatization, the equipment became a capital asset of the municipality and raised the price of privatizing the station. A grant made after a station privatized meant tax was payable on the gift.

Another step for the development community was undoing some of what had been done to allow the survival of the media it supported.

- ANEM needed to be reorganized into an open and transparent association. IREX supported the writing of new statutes, and ANEM began admitting new voting members in June 2001.
- IREX withdrew from the project of the planned new printing house for independent media. Since existing printing houses were now free to print any paper, a new plant stood to create too much printing capacity in Belgrade.

- The original owners of B92 went to court to win back its old facilities and assets. However, they were required to assume the liabilities incurred during the government's takeover. IREX provided a grant to cover some of these expenses.
- Donors had given money to media outlets that were more anti-Milosevic than truly independent. Independence needed redefinition. To this end, donors sponsored several workshops on journalist ethics and codes of professionalism. A new broadcast code adopted in 2002 helped define stations eligible for support.
- After handing its community improvement program to the mission, USAID/OTI invested all its resources into pushing the reform agenda. The goal was working with NGOs and media outlets "to push for quicker implementation of reforms and to enhance citizens' knowledge of what the reforms mean and how the reforms will affect them" (USAID/OTI 2002c).

Objectives of Media Development

IREX worked toward five objectives in continuing media development.

1. *Professionalism.* IREX expanded its training for both broadcast and print, much of it in cooperation with local training institutions. For the first time, employees of state media attended IREX-funded training. IREX continued grants that supported the Media Center's monitoring, and subsidized subscriptions to Beta and FoNet until outlets could begin paying for services.
2. *Infrastructure.* IREX implemented a small grants program for development of media infrastructure and continued its support of B92 in its effort to obtain national television coverage.
3. *Legal Assistance.* IREX provided legal expertise to conferences sponsored by local media organizations, funded the ANEM legal network that analyzes proposed laws and helps stations with legal matters, and aided municipal stations in the

privatization process. The new government still needs to rewrite media laws to meet international standards.

4. *Business Management.* IREX continues to fund ratings research for radio and television stations and readership surveys for newspapers and magazines. It provides training and consultation on use of the research. IREX also made a considerable effort to help stations reorganize staffing to sustainable levels. Media outlets needed to trim down to survive; many had overbuilt and were providing news coverage that the market could not support.
5. *Coverage of the Tribunal at The Hague.* IREX is funding coverage of the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague because Serbian media could not. IREX provided grants to house reporters from eight media outlets at The Hague and provided them with satellite connections for a year.

Program Achievements, Shortcomings, and Challenges

Achievements

Generally, Serbian media development programs funded by the U.S. Government delivered what they set out to deliver. They trained hundreds of reporters and technical people. They helped independent media build infrastructure that enabled them to survive the Milosevic regime, compete with state media, and develop and keep audiences or readership. Media assistance also helped produce and deliver material that promoted democracy and civil society before the 2000 federal elections. All broadcast media supported by IREX survived, as did weeklies *Nin* and *Vreme* and support organizations—ANEM, the Media Center, and the news agencies.

The most important achievement of the combined media programs of all donors was helping to develop independent media outlets with public credibili-

ty. Public acceptance of and trust in Serbia's independent media has grown. This is an indicator of the success of programs that aimed to develop the media's professionalism. According to Strategic Marketing's research, independent radio and television had become more professional and comprehensive by the fall of 2002, and public trust in independent media's news programs had increased from 41 to 57 percent since the last months of the Milosevic regime (SMMRI 2002a, 5). Indeed, local ANEM radio stations were seen to be the most professional news organizations in their regions, and news packages produced by local television stations were considered as professional as those on national television.

Donor help also enabled the leadership of B92 to produce a remarkable institution. With USAID support through IREX, B92 built a new broadcast center. Its professionalism improved because of training and consultation offered by IREX. It remained the top-rated station in Belgrade two years after the fall of Milosevic. The listening audiences for the station's news on ANEM stations increased despite the far superior signal coverage of Belgrade 1. B92 radio is profitable. While TV B92 is not yet profitable, its viewing audience was up significantly after a year of operation, and the television station increased its revenue dramatically in the first quarter of 2002.

Professional standards in Serbia are generally low, but in the media outlets on which U.S. aid efforts concentrated—B92, Beta, FoNet, *Vreme*, *Nin*, and some independent production houses—professional standards are relatively high. These institutions are committed to training, and they employ chief editors who generally understand professional standards.

The Media Center's review of more than two years of news program monitoring on seven television and two radio stations confirmed that the professionalism of the media had grown, especially in areas affected by donor training. Stations were more balanced in their coverage of the government and its opposition. Coverage of world events has increased since 2000 and there is new interest in international events.

Shortcomings

The problems that remain include the following:

- Though everyday problems of citizens are aired in the news—especially issues related to the economy and living standards—many radio and television stations still do not give enough time to such topics, and the average citizen does not fully understand the coverage because of the excessive use of economic jargon.
- Press conferences are covered uncritically. The more “happenings” a party schedules, the more coverage it gets.
- The news media usually present politicians in a neutral way. Negative coverage occurs only when stations cover statements made by their opponents. Such neutrality contributes to a lack of enterprise journalism. For example, stations covered what was said at the tribunal in The Hague but did little background reporting on issues raised.

However, some observers believed that many radio and television stations and daily newspapers—particularly local ones—do not exhibit a basic level of professionalism. Political pressure created by municipal ownership of local media outlets was one of the biggest obstacles to developing professional reporting standards. Ljiljana Neskovic reported that at least five ANEM members faced political pressure to slant news, and chief editors of two more were removed for political reasons. Until municipal stations can be privatized, they will continue to face political pressure from their city councils to slant coverage.

One of the biggest shortcomings of all the international media assistance programs was their inability to foster a successful, serious independent daily newspaper. *Danas*, the serious daily supported by the international donor community, continues to suffer from low readership. It was not seen as a serious player in Strategic Marketing's review of media for 2001. The paper had a kind of collective leadership that did not direct or control its staff. IREX offered extensive research support and assistance to deal with these weaknesses, but *Danas* did not

implement changes. At times, the U.S. Embassy urged support, but the donors generally did not favor offering new financial help until the paper adopted decent business practices. According to IREX's Sam Compton, *Danas* survives because of the "drip feed" of aid that comes from the international community support for special supplements.

Supporting institutions have begun to meet the standards necessary to support media sustainability. Beta and FoNet, the independent news agencies, provide professional news coverage to all media in Serbia. The Belgrade Media Center conducts media monitoring, offers training, issues roundtables, a library, a café, and a venue for media events such as press conferences. It is a vital supporting institution for all Serbian media.

With the help of IREX and its consultants, ANEM was transformed from a (necessarily) secretive organization run by a board of three to a more open organization governed by a board elected from a larger membership. ANEM is providing the traditional services of an association: training, research, lobbying, copyright negotiation, and technical support. It has been extraordinarily successful in developing a radio network that has served a large audience. When donors primarily supported independent media, ANEM obtained money and services for members and helped them survive. While ANEM still has transition problems, station managers testified that it has been beneficial—if not critical—to their survival. They noted that syndicated news attracted new audiences, and that the legal strength of independent broadcasters was improved (SMMRI 2002b, 7).

Notwithstanding these successes, the economic picture looks bleak for most independent media. Serbia has many more media outlets than the market can support. According to media observers, the saving grace for traditionally independent media is that former-regime media are even less competently managed; their staffs are larger, and their equipment is outdated.

Stations that IREX has consulted with generally operate with higher productivity than other media outlets. They have smaller staffs and run more efficiently than state outlets, and many have better computer and digital equipment. However, some independent media outlets have been overbuilt. For example, B92 had many more radio and television staff than its market could support. Much of IREX's work has been consulting with B92 on "rightsizing" staff.

The media's supporting institutions—ANEM and the Media Center—have worked to develop and pass good laws, and international donors provided expert commentary. Though the most draconian aspects of the media law have been repealed, needed legislation has not been passed, and what has been passed has not been implemented. Strong pressure from embassies—especially European embassies—will be necessary to bring Serbia's laws in line with European standards.

For broadcasters, the failure to improve the regulatory environment has meant there have been no corrections of the inequities of the past licensing regime. Stations that were friendly to the Milosevic government, especially TV Pink and BK TV, had licenses and broad coverage that they managed to keep under the new government. Many "traditionally independent" stations do not have licenses. They are frozen with inferior coverage and operate under temporary authority. Because they do not have license security, they cannot attract investment. According to Ljiljana Smajlovic,

The lag in adopting new media laws has created a legal vacuum that now hinders press freedoms. The media are kept guessing as to what the rules will be.... There is, as a consequence, very little movement toward business and market oriented sustainability. (Smajlovic 2002)

Sustainability and Related Challenges

In Serbia, there are more stations and print outlets than the market can maintain: even neighboring

countries with stronger economies do not support the number of near national services that are trying to take root in Serbia. The country has three channels of RTS, BK Telekom, TV Pink, Politika, Kosava, YU Info, Studio B, and B92.

The situation of local independent media is not promising. Very few will survive in the free market, since it cannot support the number of media outlets the international community has fostered. The outlets that international donors support produce news, and most advertisers want to buy time on entertainment programs. Thus, media assistance is needed in Serbia for several more years.

The following were among the problems noted.

Inadequate Media Law

Media outlets face huge legal expenses relating to drafting laws and templates for labor or advertising contracts, preparing for license tenders, and protecting journalists from lawsuits. The country's legal system needs to support and sustain a large and vibrant independent media, but this is unlikely to happen without strong diplomatic pressure.

Insufficient Attention to Marketing

Many outlets view themselves as alternative public media—they are mission-driven rather than market-driven. Many traditionally independent media have never worried about marketing. They do not have large enough sales staffs. A station or newspaper with a production staff of 12 and a sales staff of one is not sustainable.

Media outlets were driven by donors—rather than readers, viewers, or listeners—because they received funds from donors rather than advertising. When appealing to donors, many local independent television stations argued that their target was the “whole community.” And that is what donors wanted to hear. But markets want targeted readers, listeners, and viewers; an “all things to all people” strategy does not lead to commercial success. Many media outlets find it difficult to give up any part of the audience to focus on another part.

Overbuilding

All media assistance programs were under political pressure to fund more media outlets than the market could bear. Many such outlets now have major financial problems. The need to support the opposition provided some justification. Further, IREX and others supported local television, radio, and newspapers when a mayor who wanted support for his local outlet received a hearing from the State Department. There was U.S. Embassy pressure to support *Danas*, though professionals have concluded that the newspaper does not have the readership to make it successful. Some media outlets developed an entitlement mentality, and others used guilt to extend support.

“Donor affection” has prolonged the life of some media outlets that no longer significantly contribute to the overall media scene. It has also led to overbuilding the capacity of excellent outlets to the point of weakening them. Some overbuilding was due to implementers who did not understand modern broadcasting. For example, they provided radio studios that required two people to operate rather than one. Other donors provided media outlets with less efficient analog—rather than digital—equipment.

At times, despite very good donor coordination, some stations or production houses received more production grants than staff could handle. These outlets ramped up for production. Following the elections, the new level of staffing was not sustainable. Painful downsizing was needed to remain competitive in a market with a limited advertising base. It was very difficult for media managers to make personnel decisions based on merit and productivity. Many outlets had tightly knit staffs who had been through harrowing experiences.

Ownership

How “social property” is privatized will have a large impact on sustainability. In Kosovo and in Croatia, some media outlets were sold to their staff, who voted for their governing board. When such boards owed their positions to staff, there was a disincentive to lay off people. Further, in Kosovo, staff have

been reluctant to take on new “owners” who may be market-oriented. Staff members who receive ownership shares do not view ownership as an equity investment but as a ticket to job security. Since privatization has been slowed in Serbia, there is a chance to learn from the negative experiences of Radio 101 in Zagreb or municipal media houses in Prizren, Kosovo.

Capital Investment

One problem faced by all independent media will be access to capital investment. It is difficult for local independent media outlets to find capital for investment in infrastructure. For example, when B92 wanted to build studios, there just was not enough money available in the commercial money market. Part of this problem is due to licensing. Stations with temporary licenses cannot get commercial money. There is no “level playing field” in frequency allocation. Independent radio and television stations generally have poor frequencies, bad transmitter sites, and low power. They compete under a tremendous handicap.

The need to compete in a market that is technology driven has created a capital barrier for the creation of television networks. Donors—and even governments—have not had the resources to enter the market, and alternative local capital is not available. This has led to the dominance of foreign investment in television networks in transition states. The networks with substantial foreign investment have driven under indigenous commercial broadcasters with no Western equity partner.

This dynamic has concentrated print and broadcast media in very few hands. In Serbia, there has been Austrian investment in *Blic* and German investment in *Politika*. As municipal stations are privatized, the fear is that the only people with the capital to enter into privatization will be either political or criminal. Because of these fears, Aleksandar Tijanic, President Kostunica’s media advisor, urged a team member to continue U.S. support for B92 for at least another two years.

The lack of a rational capital market for media investment in Serbia requires that media donors provide enough investment to overcome the “capital barrier” experienced by all Serbian media. Donors need to research mechanisms that will fund the depreciation of capital assets, including national transmission systems and equipment replacement, so that stations can remain independent.

Competition from Public Broadcasting

Competition from RTS affects the sustainability of independent electronic media in Serbia. In transition societies, public broadcasting and state television will always have advertisers who want to curry favor with the government, including enterprises with substantial state investment, companies privatized to cronies of the government, and firms wanting to do business with the government. They advertise to reach the targeted audience of political officials, not because the market justifies doing so.

To support sustainability of independent commercial media, there must be guarantees that public media cannot undercut commercial prices. The dire financial state of RTS means it will have to sell commercials for the foreseeable future. If a public station has a financial cap on advertising revenue it will be tempted to lower prices and increase advertising slots to make sales easier. U.S. implementers will have to help local stations lobby for laws that limit the number of minutes per hour that public broadcasting can sell. To guarantee equity in coverage, U.S. assistance is also needed to lobby for licenses and access to transmission facilities controlled by the public broadcaster.

Support Institutions and Training

Serbia has begun to develop strong supporting institutions, including the Belgrade Media Center, NUNS, ANEM, APEM, and several human rights organizations. Some support organizations have overlapping jurisdictions and interests, and better coordination is called for between the Independent Journalists’ Association, the Nezavisnot Trade Union Confederation, and NUNS. The International Federation of Journalists could help in this area, as it has done in other countries.

For broadcasters, short-term training facilities at the ANEM training center, InVision, and the BBC-managed European Center for Broadcast Journalism are adequate. There needs to be more emphasis on print media, though training conducted at media outlets such as *Vreme* and the *Ekonomist* serve some of these needs. In the long run, Serbia will need a postgraduate journalism training facility.

Additional Challenges

When the review team asked Serbian media professionals whether things were better than they had been under Milosevic, a surprising number replied that they were worse. The General Secretary of ANEM credits nostalgia for such negative feelings. In the days of Milosevic, journalists benefited from the self-image of being on the right side and standing together heroically. Another factor may be that Serbian media are beginning to face some of the same challenges that media in countries further into the transition have faced. The sector's biggest challenge is too much media, and the most critical issue is not concentration of control but fragmentation.

Fragmentation

National television viewing is very fragmented. Though TV Pink has a 25–30 percent audience share, there are over 1,300 broadcasting stations in Serbia. Valjevo has 12 radio stations serving 70,000 people, and the situation is similar throughout the country. The number of stations has increased despite a freeze on new outlets: many are little more than computer hard drives loaded with music attached to a transmitter. Serious Serbian newsweeklies also have fractured markets.

To develop a viable commercial media sector, some outlets will have to fail. In broadcast, diminution will come through regulation; stations that do not meet minimum technical or public service standards will lose their licenses. IREX is working to merge weak local municipal and commercial stations into stronger regional outlets as part of its privatization project, but sustainability may require a law that limits the number of stations.

Professionalism

The main barrier to professionalism in Serbian media is that most staff are not oriented toward audience needs. Journalists generally do not think of themselves as surrogates for the public, asking questions and providing answers of interest to the public. Rather, they view themselves as representing the interests of their employers—the state or municipality, in many instances—who pass on information that media owners think the public needs to know.

Public and Private Media

Independent public broadcasting is essential in democracies. B92 is Serbia's independent public service broadcaster: it is mission driven, runs the type of public service programs that public broadcasters do in other countries, and, until now, had not relied on advertising. B92 had government support, but it came from governments other than Serbia's. One of the country's challenges will be to make sure that B92 and some of the regional stations can survive as surrogate public broadcasters. There is no chance that B92 can survive on contributions from listeners, and the government is unlikely to support it. Surrogate public stations need the level of signal coverage that is available to RTS and the big commercial stations like BK and Pink. They need modern and efficient production facilities. Most importantly, they need to reduce debt and have a mechanism for capitalization, since it will be difficult for stations like B92 to meet depreciation, cash reserve, and recapitalization for new technologies.

Privatization

How media held as social property and as municipal property will be privatized will continue to be an issue in Serbia. Even B92 has yet to be privatized. The station license is still “social property,” though most of the equipment is owned by a private company or by the ANEM foundation. Privatization is always complicated. In some countries, valuable assets have gone to cronies of the government. This is a real possibility in Serbia as municipal stations go on the auction block. Almost as bad is privatization that gives shares to staff.

Availability of Trained Professionals

When Milosevic fell, B92 and the ANEM stations employed a core of well-trained, professional journalists. Since then—and despite large training efforts by IREX and others—that pool has been diluted. Implementers are not able to keep up with the demand for trained journalists because there are too many media outlets looking for employees and too many untrained journalists in media like RTS. Several media outlets—particularly state radio and television—have hired away many of the journalists that IREX had trained. B92 itself has greatly expanded its television news coverage and is having trouble finding qualified applicants. The journalism faculty also needs reform so that the school can begin to turn out quality journalists.

Journalists' Self-Image

A survey of journalists found that many would change professions if they could, and more than half would not want their children to become journalists. Most believed that among factors limiting journalists' abilities to do their jobs were: political pressures on the editorial policy, self-censorship and their own lack of courage or adaptability, and lack of courage on the part of editors. (SMMRI 2002d)

Truth and Reconciliation

Documentaries on war crimes do not attract viewers or advertisers. Normally, public media deal with such issues. The large audience for coverage from The Hague indicated that Serbs will watch programs that may be uncomfortable. RTS only broadcast the opening weeks of the Milosevic trial. B92 has carried on, and, for the time being, seems to be the only broadcast medium willing to take on the role. Some print media, especially *Nin*, have also begun to engage in self-examination about the role of the media in promoting nationalism and war.

New York University's Center for War, Peace, and the News Media has, with ANEM, sponsored some training for journalists in dealing with the issue, both within media institutions and presenting it to the public.

Lessons

Before translating the Serbian experience to other countries, special conditions warrant consideration. Serbia was not an absolute dictatorship. Although Milosevic was an authoritarian who wanted to maintain the appearance of democracy, the independent media, opposition, and civil society had room to move. Unlike other Eastern European countries, Serbia had just emerged from war, and the media had the task of helping society deal with the aftermath.

1 Media can have a significant impact on regime change, but not in isolation.

In Serbia, the independent media had a material impact on the overthrow of Milosevic. Media assistance programs funded by USAID were essential in helping media carry out this undertaking. USAID assistance helped media outlets survive and gave them the skills and the physical means to transmit news and information. USAID did not dictate the content of the messages; media outlets were allowed and even encouraged to be independent. This independence—and, more importantly, the public's awareness of this independence—was essential. However, local independent media cannot effect change alone. The entire civil society sector—including opposition political parties, labor unions, and NGOs—and the international community have to work together. The fact that a growing and vibrant civil society and political opposition, albeit disorganized, existed in Serbia from the mid-1990s made it easier for the U.S. Government and other donors to support the opposition movement.

2 Both short- and long-term goals are important.

The Serbian experience shows that planners should keep two goals of media aid in mind: getting information out to citizens during a crisis period and building the capacity of independent media. If implementers and donors overbuild outlets to accomplish the first goal, they may not survive. While getting the immediate message out is impor-

tant, institution building is more important in the long run. Media assistance programs supported some media in Serbia that will not survive. But, for the most part, supporting them was worthwhile in the short term.

To create sustainability, media assistance agencies need to withdraw aid from outlets they once helped to leave enough resources for others that have a chance of surviving. Sustainability will depend on adequate advertising revenues and the size of the media market. Media assistance programs need to look at the size and structure of the media market. This awareness is required so that international aid agencies can time withdrawal of support. Withdrawal too early will strand media outlets donors have fostered. However, withdrawal too late will create a culture of dependence and cause outlets to program for donors rather than readers, listeners, or viewers.

3 Media development requires a broad approach.

Radio, television, print, the internet, and news agencies were all essential parts of the media package that enabled democratic elements to get messages out. They were catalysts for the regime change. USAID-funded programs approached development from several directions, while focusing on a few media outlets. Initially, support for ANEM radio and television networks included station equipment, interconnection by satellite and internet, journalism training, management consultation, commercial program acquisition, and research to guide development and allow for course corrections. The development of entertainment features such as quiz shows and sports coverage is essential to build the audience for news and other information.

To support sustainability, media assistance programs also have to work to increase professional standards so there continues to be a pool of trained reporters, technicians, layout artists, graphic designers, and photographers. Ultimately, high-quality journalism education should be

available at the postgraduate level. It is also important to have midcareer journalism education available for people who have backgrounds in economics and the sciences.

4 Radio is a crucial medium.

Under normal circumstances, radio is not as important as television in getting out information. In a crisis, however, this inexpensive “stealth” medium makes a large difference. In Serbia, local stations and voices provided a local context for national events that was augmented by national programming from B92. Local radio carried the messages when B92 was off the air, television was not available, and restrictions on newsprint limited the circulation of newspapers. With small capital investments, the small staffs of local stations broadcast a great deal of information. In a crisis, radio is portable and ubiquitous. People relied on transistor and car radios during demonstrations and in the final days of the Milosevic regime.

The donor community should concentrate on strengthening media partners believed to be most commercially viable for license competition. A new broadcast license category may provide an answer to the problem of fragmentation. The government could create a community service license that would have stricter public service standards, stringent ownership requirements, greater reporting transparency, and profit caps. Concession fees would be waived and advertising taxes reduced for stations that choose to be licensed under this rubric. It may be in the best interests of international donors—especially U.S. donors—to either support mandated public service requirements for commercial broadcasters or support a higher spectrum tax for commercial stations that do not meet a public service requirement.

5 A coordinated effort is required to develop and sustain a critical mass.

In Serbia, critical mass was attained with massive amounts of coordinated international aid that was

directed toward a few institutions: ANEM and B92, the news agencies, the Media Center, and a few weeklies. Donor coordination occurred at every level and was aided by a common political will and a shared and constant goal. On the ground, this coordinated and focused approach prevented some media outlets from playing one donor off another and stopped some outlets from “double dipping.” On-the-ground donor coordination meetings became brainstorming sessions that pointed all the donors and implementers toward necessary corrections.

6 A successful program requires international political support.

U.S. and international political support was as important as material support. State Department officials testified that Milosevic held off on persecuting independent media because of pressure from the international community. Since his fall, some independent media outlets feel that international pressure on the Serbian government has not been as strong. They believe such pressure is required to properly and fairly regulate independent media and create a level playing field for independent media to compete with former pro-Milosevic media.

7 Grassroots leadership is necessary.

B92 had developed its news reputation before received international aid. The marriage of B92’s professionalism and the local patriotism of member stations made ANEM work. Vreme was a trendsetting weekly before the 1996 municipal elections. Serbians trusted these outlets and others not only because they were good but because they were theirs. Local outlets remained trustworthy because they were careful to follow their own editorial policies, not those imported from the United States. Although Soros helped organize meetings that led to the foundation of NUNS, the Belgrade Media Center, and ANEM, it knew when to let local people take the lead. Unless institutions have clearly defined and strong local leadership, they will fail.

8 Necessary legal reforms take a long time.

Legal reform will take longer than estimated, and media assistance agencies should prepare themselves and the media organizations they work with for a long fight. Though media law reform is often at the top of published agendas when new governments come to power, it soon sinks far down the list. The status quo works nicely for new transitional governments. It suits politicians to keep tough libel laws hanging over media that may become “too independent.” The dearth of freedom of information laws makes significant reporting on government wrongdoing more difficult. In the absence of a good broadcasting law, legitimate independent broadcast stations in Serbia were unable to obtain capital to improve transmission and production facilities. Broadcasters who were willing to take money from investors whose interest was primarily political gained advantages over more independent media outlets.

9 Constant feedback, correction, and flexibility are essential.

The emphasis put on research by implementers contributed to the success of the Serbian program. Because implementers, donors, and media outlets knew how many people were reading, viewing, and listening, they could target aid to the most effective outlets, and outlets could make midcourse corrections. Media monitoring helped donors identify balanced, fair, and professional outlets and recognize which issues were being covered. Media monitoring also gave trainers a tool that directed them to areas needing improvement.

The Western tradition of independent public broadcasting does not exist in Serbia and other posttransition countries. To use television and radio to build democracy, donors must deal with a surrogate public broadcaster such as B92. If donors force such stations to market dependency too soon, they may be forcing them to abandon the mission.

Media assistance should last long enough to allow mission-driven commercial media outlets to become stable and survive. That means assistance should last until a sophisticated market of advertisers is developed who want to reach people interested in news and public affairs. Another way to help surrogate public broadcasters would be to promote a special class of license that waives concession fees and reduces taxes for stations willing to cap profits and meet certain conditions of program service, ownership, and transparency. However, given the problems Serbian independent media have had in promoting legal reform, this type of license is unlikely.

10 Invest in people.

The biggest legacy of the media assistance program in Serbia is the people trained, consulted, and worked with, as colleagues and partners. Ray Jennings of OTI's Serbia program said: "I am particularly proud of the local staff I worked with during the hard times. They and the people they continue to influence will go on to be the calm, powerful voices and models of necessary progressive change."

11 Local demand and capacity are required.

The greatest lesson learned from this development project was the absolute requirement of local, indigenous demand for change and local capacity to create change. These two components were evident in Serbia from the very beginning of international donor assistance. The local demand for change, finally acknowledged by the U.S. Government when millions of people demonstrated for over three months in 1996–97, allowed USAID to restart its democracy assistance program. The leadership capacity of local media, NGOs, and other civil society proponents created the opportunities required to force political change in Serbia. Notwithstanding the amount of money spent in Serbia, local demand and capacity were absolutely necessary for the success of what was essentially a Serbian development project, assisted by the West.

Annex 1: USAID/OTI and IREX Media Assistance Grants

	ANEM	Station Programs	Station Technology	Indep. Production	Associations	News Agency	Print	Media Center	NGO & Web Mag	Totals
Takeoff, June 97–Feb. 99										
<i>OTI Grants</i>										
Value	466,291	11,750	360,398	183,845	25,035	36,419	169,274	197,895	85,262	1,536,169
Number	11	2	17	10	3	2	27	5	7	84
<i>IREX Grants</i>										
Value	154,250									154,250
Number	9									9
Survival Time, March 99–May 00										
<i>OTI Grants</i>										
Value	13,000	37,096	110,459	210,251	6,750	79,100	113,454	55,528	19,657	645,295
Number	1	2	8	14	1	4	10	3	3	46
<i>IREX Grants</i>										
Value	1,343,500				86,500	69,500	679,200			2,178,700
Number	4				2	1	4			11
Election/Revolution Time, May–Oct. 00										
<i>OTI Grants</i>										
Value	93,100	38,011	52,940	54,797	40,000		110,738	13,000	112,312	514,898
Number	3	4	4	7	1		6	1	10	36
<i>IREX Grants</i>										
Value	101,270	199,585	157,030	80,625		101,775	116,910	50,000	197,630	1,004,825
Number	3	48	18	3		3	4	1	3	83
Development Time, Oct. 00–02										
<i>OTI Grants</i>										
Value	249,360	150,258	32,630	371,887	2,250	104,750	177,680	91,640	164,237	1,344,692
Number	7	17	3	23	1	2	9	5	8	75
<i>IREX Grants</i>										
Value	1,465,724	207,383	57,026	134,310	18,856	163,502	256,132	655,120	22,761	2,980,814
Number	13	12	10	13	3	10	13	10	2	86
Subtotal										
Value	3,886,495	644,083	770,483	1,035,715	179,391	555,046	1,623,388	1,063,183	601,858	10,359,643
Subtotal										
Number	51	85	60	70	11	22	73	25	33	430
Value IREX Grants for Pebbles Program										
										2,313,119
Value, OTI Grants for Ring Around Serbia										
										69,840
IREX and OTI funding for transmitters outside Serbia										
										2,372,959
Total Value, IREX and OTI Grants, 2000–02										12,682,602

Note: Figures do not include administrative costs and nongrant activities (such as consultation) directly paid for by IREX or OTI.
OTI figures include several grants categorized as "regional" that primarily benefited Serbia; grants that covered Kosovo are not included.

Annex 2: Individuals Interviewed

Paige Alexander, vice president, IREX

Jovan Arezina, director, Studio B

Bruce Armstrong, SEED coordinator, USAID

Aleksandar Arsehjevic, Ozon, Cacak

Herman Baskar, media officer, Norwegian People's Aid

Milan Bastovanovic, USAID

Milan Begic, managing director of marketing, B92 RTV, Belgrade

Antal Biaci, director, Radio Subotica

Sonja Biserko, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights

Srdjan Bogasavlijevic, director, SMMRI

Anne Marie Bostrom, Swedish Helsinki Committee

Darko Brocic, general manager, AGB

Nenad Cekic, owner, Radio Index, Belgrade

Goran Ciric, mayor, Niš

Sam Compton, chief of party, IREX Belgrade

Petar Danilovic, director, Radio Uzica

Zejnulla Dauti, Radio Preševo

Ramila Dulovic, CEO, InVision

Momcilo Đurđić, assistant director for development, RTV Pirot

Robert Fejsztamer, president, Union of Hungarian Students

John Fox, Independent Broadcasters Support Project

Marina Fratucan, director, URBANS

Julia Glyn Pickett, BBC Training Trust

Skender Halili, Radio Preševo

Zaim Haliti, director, Jehona

Patrick Harpur, president, BK Television

Slobodan Homen, executive director, Otpor

Novka Ilic, former director, Radio Uzica

Velimir Ilic, mayor, Cacak

Ištvan Išpanovic, mayor, Subotica

Slavko Janošević, director, RTV Kraljevo

Milovan Jaukovic, foreign editor, *Danas*

Dušan Jevtic, executive director, FoNet

Viktor Jovic, director, Radio Patak, Valjevo

Lubiša Jovešević, mayor, Kraljevo

Slavoljub Kacarevic, director and editor in chief, *Glas Javnosti*

Nataša Kandic, director, Humanitarian Law Fund	Veran Matic, editor in chief and chairman of the board, B92-ANEM
Goran Karadzic, acting director and editor in chief, TV Apolo	Miomirka Melak, acting director, Radio Kikinda
Aleksandar Karic, vice president of municipal assembly, Lazarevac	Aneta Mihajlovic, deputy editor in chief, RTS
Obrad Kesic, media consultant	Zoran Mihajlovic, director, Radio Index, Belgrade
Petar Kokaj, editor in chief, <i>Magzar Syo</i>	Dragana Milecevic, editor in chief, Studio B
Zarko Korac, deputy prime minister, Republic of Serbia	Zoran Mileševic, director and editor in chief, Radio VK
Darko Kasic, director, City Radio	Marja Miloselovic, project manager, RTV B92
Nataša Koturovic, Stability Pact for SE Europe	Saša Mirkovic, general manager, RTV B92
Dragan Kovacevic, director, RTV Cacak	Zelko Mitrovic, president and CEO, Pink
Predrag Kovacevic, director and editor in chief, TV5 Uzica	William Montgomery, ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Mijat Lakicevic, editor in chief, <i>Ekonomist</i>	Slobodanka Nedovic, director, CeSID
Sonja Licht, director, Open Society Fund	Miloje Nesic, technical director, RTV Pirot
Radomir Licina, president, <i>Danas</i>	Ljiljana Neškovic, network director, ANEM
Svetlana Loger, research director, SMMRI	Slavica Nikolic-Corbic, editor in chief and CEO, TV 5, Niš
Bojan Markovic, director, RTV Bajina Bašta	Jim O'Brien, special advisor, U.S. Department of State
Dragan Markovic, chairman and managing director, TV Palma Plus, Jagodina	Zoran Ostojic, director, MREZA
Dušan Markovic, technical director, Studio B	Miodrag Pesic, producer
Lubica Markovic, director, BETA News Agency	Vladica Radevic, deputy, InVision
Jadranka Markovic, director, Ozon, Cacak	Ljilana Radonovic, director, MREZA
Dusan Masic, media advisor, IREX Belgrade	Andreja Rakocevic, director and editor in chief, Radio Globus, Kraljevo

Paul Randolph, Serbia country director, USAID/OTI

Aleksandar Rankovic, director, Radio Luna,

Uzice Lester Robinson, consultant, IREX

Paul Rowland, director, NDI

Zoran Sekulic, director and editor in chief, FoNet

Nevana Simendic, deputy director, RTV Pancevo
Veselina Simonovic, editor in chief, *Blic*

Ljiljana Smalovic, IREX consultant and *Nin*
journalist

Wout Soer, European Agency for Reconstruction

Aleksandar Spacic, director, STRING, consultant to
RTV Pirot

Negojša Spaic, editor in chief, Radio 202

Bratislav Stamenkovic, director and editor in chief,
Gradska TV, Niš

Katheryn Stevens, democracy and governance officer,
U.S. Embassy

James Stevenson, mission director, U.S. Embassy

Srdan Stojanovic, deputy director, RTV Pirot

Sobodan Stojšić, director and editor in chief,
Radio 021

Gordana Suša, editor in chief, *Vin*

Jim Swigert, former deputy assistant secretary for
Europe, U.S. Department of State

Miša Tadic, owner and director, Boom 93,

Pozarevac Andrijan Tasic, executive board, Niš

Aleksandar Tijanic, advisor to President Koštunica

Boban Tomic, mayor, Bajina Bašta

Tomislav Vagner, producer, Virus Production,
Dubravka

Valic-Nedeljkovic, chair, school board, Novi Sad
School of Journalism

Ivan Vlatkovic, marketing director, Pink

Perica Vucinic, reporter

Dejan Vujovic, senior researcher, SMMRI

Mark Whitehouse, director, media development
division, IREX

Dragoljub Zarkovic, director and editor in chief,
Vreme

Branislav Zivkovic, attorney, Zivcovic & Samardzic

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Editorial, design, and production assistance was provided by IBI-International Business Initiatives, Arlington, VA, under contract no. HFM-C-00-01-00143-00. For more information, contact IBI's Publications and Graphics Support Project at 703-525-2277 or mail@ibi-usa.com.

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